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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE FUTURE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: A REVISION OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN S. CHAPPELL United States Army

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#### USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# THE FUTURE USE OF MILITARY FORCE:

A REVISION OF THE

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#### ABSTRACT

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The evolving nature of the world overshadows the Armed Forces with an uncertain future. Emerging threats and the changing complexities of the world cause us to review how we, as a nation, intend to apply the military element of power. This ambiguous and volatile situation dictates that the military develop a framework from which to offer appropriate advice to our political leadership on the future use of military force.

Through an analysis of our values-based history, the direction of our senior military leadership, and the 1988 Weinberger Doctrine, it is clear that a framework is necessary in deciding how to promote national values and protect national interests. This paper proposes a revision of the Weinberger Doctrine that will assist our senior leadership in deciding about the future use of military force.

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#### Introduction

"You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve suffering, to help officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic army and still...to win our wars."

President Clinton, 29 May 1993 USMA Graduation Address

The 1990's has set the stage for a new and different approach in wielding the military element of power. With the end of the cold war, our military was faced with declining budgets, a multitude of diverse threats, and a necessity to remain relevant in our role of safeguarding national interests. These three areas have spiraled our military into force reduction, expanded roles and missions, and force structure redesign for the 21st century.

In particular with our need to remain relevant, the military element of power is being utilized in ways that were inconceivable during the cold war. We are no longer in a position to husband this element of power for use only when vital interests are at stake. However, we appear not to have a framework from which we can logically advise our political leadership on the future use of military force.

Therefore, it is my premise that we should revise the Weinberger Doctrine as a framework in deciding the appropriate future use of military force. In order to do this, my examination of this issue will take the following approach. First, it is important to review much the background from which

Americans derive their conservative thought on use of military force. Second, analysis on the prospects of global security in the near term is relevant to any future framework. Third, it is necessary to review how our senior leadership views the changing role of the military. Fourth, a discussion of the current Weinberger Doctrine will show its relationship to future global security issues. Finally, a revised Weinberger Doctrine is provided as a framework by which our senior leadership can determine the appropriate future use of military force.

## Background

America was formed as a nation of immigrants many of which fled to this continent to escape oppression in other lands. A large part of their legacy established our national foundation of strong religious beliefs, high moral and ethical values, and emphasis on individual rights and freedom. As our nation evolved through internal struggles and interaction with other nations, the tendency has been to pursue a moralistic or values-based approach to involvement abroad.

Our national values are intertwined with decisions concerning the use of military force in safeguarding stated national interests. While Americans generally support protecting our national security interests, they have seldom supported lengthy military ventures abroad. With the termination of overseas involvement, American's have tended to revert toward isolationism. Our history has shown that domestic issues take on greater significance in times of peace or when threats are ill

defined. Over time, Americans have developed a particular sense for the use of military force. Based on our experience,

"the people expect the military to accomplish its missions in compliance with national values. The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met...In the end, the people will pass judgement on the appropriateness of the conduct and use of military operations. Their values and expectations must be met."

Within our own military, we can see these national values expressed even today. Army doctrine still highlights the fact that decisions to use military force will be based on the moral and ethical judgements of our senior leaders. As noted in current Army doctrine, the foundation for the employment of military forces

"...attempts to follow the principles of Just War theory, and seeks to use force in pursuit of a <u>just cause</u>, as a <u>last resort</u>, and with the ultimate <u>aim of a lasting peace</u>."<sup>3</sup>

The Just War theory encapsulates our national values and forms the basis from which our senior military leadership provides advice on the use of military force.

During periods of ill defined threats such as we are experiencing now, Americans turn inward toward domestic issues. Our leadership is conscious of that fact and must be prepared to cultivate American support when direct threats to our national security interests arise. We have only to look at our 20th Century involvements to realize how important the support of the American people is to our successful use of military force. Even as recent as the Gulf War, our senior leadership was cognizant of

the fact that:

"All the military history of the past 40 years in which the U.S. has been a major participant shows that the American people will, in the last analysis, not support long wars in the interest of geopolitical issues whose outcome does not appear to threaten us directly, especially if they turn into slugging matches among heavy forces with extensive casualties on both sides."

As we refine future National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, we must remember that "the ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation." In determining the ends, ways, and means by which the nation decides to utilize military force, national values will be the overarching foundation for this strategy of the future. To meet the future challenges we face, we must develop a shift in American thought. As noted in the 1994 Department of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress:

"A new consensus among Americans on using force in the Post-Cold War era will not emerge overnight. That consensus is likely to emerge from a rigorous examination of the importance of U.S. interests at stake in future conflicts and clear assessments of potential costs, risks, and benefits of alternative courses of action."

As we revise the Weinberger Doctrine, national values cannot be separated from national interests. National values will continue to play a major role in determining the future use of military force. This fact may either enhance or impede the development of revised strategies for the future. It is with this background, that we will now turn to some analysis on the prospects for global security in the near term.

## Global Security Prospects

Following the cold war, our nation found itself faced with a multitude of new challenges and threats. No longer would the bipolar world exist between the Soviet Union and the United States. The soviet threat was replaced with a myriad of uncertain elements which will drive our strategic thought well into the 21st Century and beyond. New, future threats are aptly defined by the following:

# The Changing Threat

Single (Soviet)

NEW
Diverse

Survival at Stake Americans Interests at Stake

Known Unknown

Deterable Non-Deterable

Strategic Use of Nukes Terrorists Use of Nukes

Overt Covert

Europe Centered Regional, Ill-Defined

High Risk of Escalation Little Risk of Escalation<sup>7</sup>

Based on these diverse threats, it becomes more difficult to define our national interests. This is especially true for those interests that we, as a nation, are willing to apply military force. These threats will result in a redefinition of our interests on a global scale. They will further alter the basis from which we define the use of military force in safeguarding those interests.

This diverse reality of the world situation has led us to evaluate not only the use of future military force but to question the very nature of such force. As we look to the future, we must question how the use of military force is appropriate in ensuring our national security interests. As a military, we now must ask ourselves the following questions.

- "1. Does participation advance U.S. national interests?
- 2. Are the objectives clear and obtainable?
- 3. How will the intervention affect our other defense obligations?
- 4. Can the United States contribute capabilities and assets necessary for the success of the mission?"8

With all this uncertainty, our senior military leadership is faced with redefining when, where, and how we will use military force. The first attempt to do this was to define the context within which military force could be applied. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin defined this context as shown below:

## The Changing Context

OLD	NEW
Bipolar Rigidity	Multipolar Complexity
Predictable	Uncertain
Communism	Nationalism/Religious Extremism
US Dominant Western Power	US Military No 1/Not Economically
Fixed Alliances	"Ad Hoc" Coalitions
"Good Guys and Bad Guys"	"Grey Guys"
UN Paralyzed	UN Viable <sup>9</sup>

We can envision how this changing context causes a shift in our overall strategy. It further heightens concern about dealing with

weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, regional powers, drug trafficking, and economic threats.

If we look deeper into this new context, one can anticipate challenges to our national interests on all fronts. The complexities of the globe show a more diffuse and complex interrelationship between values, economics, management of information and military forces. For the future use of military force, we must be careful that we do not dissipate our military capability attempting to confront the uncertainty of the situation we face. It will be key to have clearly defined national interests in order to prevent dissipating our military our military capability. As noted by former Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan:

"There is an emotional temptation to want to 'do something' without first clearly understanding what political purpose that 'something' is supposed to accomplish."

Values of nationalistic and religious extremist groups are taking greater hold on domestic and world affairs. Their influence transcends known nation-state boundaries resulting in both inter-state and intra-state friction. The influence of these groups has already been seen in places like Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Their actions have caused us to question our own values as a nation resulting in increased values-based or humanitarian type interventions.

Economies of the world are becoming more inter-connected with the expanse of the information age. This global interrelationship has significant impact on sovereign nations.

Economic competition belies a nation's well being. The distribution of wealth and other resources influences the interests of all nations and groups on a global scale. As noted by Ralph Peters:

"Worldwide social burification will lead increasingly to a triage approach to diplomacy, aid, and interventions, and a sobered West will prove necessarily selective in its military deployments, concentrating on financial interests and lifestyle-protection."<sup>11</sup>

Specific military threats become less definable as we begin to experience the dissolution of nation-states. Issues on military intervention and the question of national sovereignty are less definable. Again, Bosnia is an excellent example of such an intervention where factions within a former nation-state rule the actions of the region. Somalia also shows the inherent dangers of mission creep when intervening on a value or humanitarian basis.

#### Senior Leadership Direction

As a nation and a military, we have begun to adapt to the changing environment by becoming increasingly more involved in operations throughout the world. As we adapt to this reality, today's situation of ambiguity and volatility provide the military with murky circumstances from which to use military force. We have demonstrated that we will no longer apply military force as a last resort. Other factors such as declining defense budgets, force reduction, and force redesign are straining our efforts toward relevance and readiness.

The significance of a declining budget impacts heavily on our employment strategy for the future. With the drawdown of the Armed Forces and the United States domestic focus, the military has been reduced to a CONUS based, power projection force. As the so-called last remaining Super Power, we realize that we can not revert to isolationism with the growing complexities of the world. As we form the future military, it has been noted that: "While it is clear that the United States cannot undertake to support every system that proclaims openness, neither can it ignore the U.S. role and presence in world affairs."

We have begun to advance our current National and Military Strategy to meet these future threats. At the same time, we must recall the tenets that allow us to employ military force. There is great institutional inertia that the military must overcome to employ forces in this changing context. Our history has left its mark on how we have employed force in the past. With an unclear future, America's military takes on a more significant role as part of the elements of power. In the interest of our own security,

"...the nation must promote an international security environment which is pervaded by confidence in its military credibility and in America's political sagacity and staging power."

Our senior leaders realize this historical significance as they forge ahead to meet the new challenges of this ever changing world. As we define the future utility of the military element of power, it is important to remember "Military forces do not exist for themselves; they are instruments, and like instruments, our success is measured by our ability to fulfill our purpose."<sup>14</sup>
As an instrument of national power, we have further refined the points of employing military force:

"The important points for employing military force successfully are: First, employ it in situations where it can accomplish its assigned missions and where those successes will contribute to the nation's ultimate political aim; second, clearly define the strategic aims before employing military force - whether in war or operations other than war." 15

While our senior military leadership has set this new direction, there is the difficult task of changing the culture of the military as well as the mindset of the American people. The complexity of the changing context and changing threats we face today, cause us to inculcate values into the thought process of when, where, and how to employ military force. As we approach future interventions, we will need the support of the American people as well as an educated military that understands its role in these interventions. As an example in the debate over continuing United States involvement in Bosnia, the first challenge of this type comes into focus. "Even if we agree on expanded involvement, the American people must understand the need to persevere and must agree that national interests warrant the commitment."

This concept of extended involvement is difficult to induce on the American public as well as a traditional military.

Clearly, this demonstrates that one truth can be gained from this analysis. The military and political leadership must convince the American people of the necessity to place American military service members in harm's way. As noted again in the 1994 Annual

Report to the President and the Congress: "The basic question has always been: What stakes or interests are important enough to justify risking the lives of American men and women in combat?" This aspect alone will require great diplomacy on the part of our senior leadership to convince the American people of our involvement in each and every situation.

Based on the threats as defined by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the military mission base has evolved as noted below:

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

		litary perations	General US Goal	Examples
C M B A T	N	WAR	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack/ Defend/Blockades
	ONCOMBAT	Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement/ NEO/Strikes/Raids/ Show of Force/ Counterterrorism/ Peacekeeping/ Counterinsurgency/ Arms Control
			Promote Peace	Antiterrorism/NEO Disaster Relief/ Peacebuilding Nation Assistance Civil Support/ Counterdrug <sup>18</sup>

Regardless of how we view these missions, the bottom line is the "fact that what basically is at issue here is the commitment of

U.S. forces to action overseas."<sup>19</sup> It is not the intent here to argue the validity or credibility of these missions. Regardless of how one feels as to the suitability of these missions, it has been determined that this is the direction in which we will focus our military force.

Rather than debate the appropriateness of these missions, it is important to note that "whether, where, when, and how to intervene militarily pose problems that call for subjective judgements." To date few formulas or sets of guidelines have driven our decisions on the use of the military. The most significant of these was the Weinberger Doctrine set forth in 1988. With the Weinberger Doctrine, senior military leaders have utilized parts or all of this framework to offer advice on the use of the military. Let us now review the relationship of the Weinberger Doctrine and future global security issues.

# Weinberger Doctrine

In 1988, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger established a set of criteria to be followed when consideration was given to the use of military force. His criteria were developed following a period where our nation struggled with the appropriate use of military force abroad. Senior military leaders recalled their experiences from the foreign policy debacle of Vietnam. This was further compounded by the intervention disaster in Beirut, Lebanon. From these experiences and others, former Secretary of Defense Weinberger saw the necessity to develop a framework from which to analyze the

appropriate use of military force. We will now look at these tenets with a view toward the future.

Tenet 1: "The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies."21

This tenet focuses on applying military force only when vital interests are at stake. It tends to shy away from using military force for any other reason. In our vision of the future, vital interests to the nation are more difficult to determine based on the inter-connectivity of all the elements of power. This problem is further compounded by the evolving interrelationship of world economies. Alliances will be based more on the 'ad hoc' coalition premise rather than through treaties or formal alliances. When coupled with emerging threats, it is more difficult to determine when vital interests are threatened.

Attacks on our vital interests will come from many directions making it more difficult to determine the direct nature of the threat. With our evolving global future, threats are likely to be more indirect than direct. The indirect nature of some threats raise the importance of national interests which were previously not considered vital. Thus, this tenet is no longer valid except for the identification of a direct military confrontation with an equal military competitor.

Tenet 2. "If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so whole heartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces and resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all."<sup>22</sup>

No one can deny that placing military forces in harm's way requires the total commitment of the military establishment and the nation to support the intervention. This is coupled with the necessary resources to ensure the safety of our personnel as well as the means to achieve the military end state of the intervention. In these terms, one may not be able to define 'winning' as the correct end state. Rather, success may be defined as a return to normalcy or status quo in a particular region of the world. Therefore, the term 'winning' does not apply across the threat spectrum.

Tenet 3."If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we would have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have, and send, the forces needed to do just that."23

A clear definition of political and military objectives continues to be key to future military success. It is incumbent upon the senior political and military leadership to ensure that we have established direction, restrictions, and rules that lead to an appropriate end state. This end state must be linked to our national interests and national values. Although I agree with this tenet wholeheartedly, the changing world will make determination of these objectives more complex. Current and future problems are "diffuse, subject to argument as to interpretation, and will take a long time to solve." The interrelationship of the other elements of power must be understood and their objectives established congruently with the military objectives.

Tenet 4. "The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary."  $^{25}$ 

Clear political and military objectives drive our military planners to design sufficient force size and composition to allow for success. It is the responsibility of our senior military leadership to advise the National Command Authority on military capabilities. Within that context, forces must execute operations with correct resources to obtain a meaningful end state. A continuous reassessment of the situation and the objectives must be made to guard against mission creep. This assessment is also necessary to adjust military force when unanticipated factors are introduced into the situation. A committed, political leadership should be cautioned to not task the military with requirements outside their capabilities. With some adjustments, this tenet has future relevance.

Tenet 5. "Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation."<sup>26</sup>

Within this tenet, senior military and political leadership must take into account our national values. The American people and the elected representatives in Congress must agree with any future commitment of military force. Further, their support is necessary to be continuous throughout such a commitment. In order to assure that commitment, a continuous flow of information

to the populous is critical to attaining the military and political objectives.

For the future, additional information is only the beginning. There is a need for a reorientation of thought processes toward national values. The future will require a reeducation of the public on how changing threats impact on our national security (whether they be direct or indirect).

Additionally, we will have to make judgement calls as to commitments that may not have popular support. This will require more openness in the media and a great degree of diplomacy on the part of our senior military leadership.

Tenet 6. "The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort."<sup>27</sup>

As our nation wields its influence in this changing world, the military cannot expect to remain relevant by only committing military might only as a last resort. Clearly in some situations, the military may become the element of choice to further national interests. As the world becomes more intertwined economically, the military may find itself possessing the best assets to deal with unique situations. The very presence of the U.S. military can assist in stabilizing many aspects of a region. Indeed, increased military assistance to foreign nations can expand democratic ideals. This influence may in fact provide the impetus to ensure stability in a region and enhance the growth of future democratic institutions.

As seen above, the totality of the current Weinberger

Doctrine can no longer dictate thinking about the future use of
military force. To remain a relevant, viable force for our
nation, we must look to the future to establish our position in
the growing complexity of the globe. Our true relevance will
dictate, part and partial, the successful future of this nation.
Therefore, we should establish a revised version of the
Weinberger Doctrine from which to approach our national security
interests.

#### The Framework for the Future

Former Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan made the first recent attempt to revise our thinking about the future use of military force. From his view, we should focus our military in three generic ways:

- "- Preventative: to prevent competition among nations from developing into crises, or crises from escalating;
- Reactive: to end conflicts on terms favorable to the United States and its allies;
- Supportive: to support stability abroad and facilitate democratic processes and free market economies."28

This approach on the use of military force appears to be more reactive than proactive in nature. As we venture forth into this uncertain and ambiguous future, it would be useful to have a generic framework from which to analyze future involvements. Therefore, a revision to the Weinberger Doctrine will provide a framework with which the military can advise our political leadership on the future use of military force.

In order to revise the Weinberger Doctrine, we must return to the definitions of National and Military Strategy. As currently defined:

"National Strategy: The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its Armed Forces, during peace and war, to further national interests, priorities, and policies."<sup>29</sup>

"Military Strategy: The art and science of employing the Armed Forces of a nation to secure the objectives of National Policy by the application of Force, or the threat of force." If we abide by these definitions as the methodology to ensure our national security interests, we only have to apply a framework to determine the appropriate, future use of the military force.

Tenet 1: The United States should be prepared to commit forces to intervention overseas when deemed appropriate to our national interests or that of our allies.

For this tenet to be viable, national interests must be reassessed and established based on changing threats, the interconnectivity of the elements of power, and consideration for our national values. Threats that directly or indirectly influence the economic well-being of this nation take on increased significance. A measure or prioritization of national interests, in concert with our national values will aid our senior military leadership in determining sufficient application of force. As has been noted:

"In this environment, the United States does not lose credibility with every decision not to intervene in a foreign crises. Instead, what is required for credibility is the careful choice of interests, the vigilant protection of these interests, and, above all, the issuance of only those threats and promises concerning those interests that will be fulfilled."<sup>31</sup>

Our allies will continue to be supported with military and economic aid without supplanting ourselves as their protector. We will not limit ourselves strictly to areas that affect our vital interests. Instead, we will be proactive in cultivating democratic ideals in prioritized areas. The measure by which this decision is made will be based on national interests that are affected by national economic well-being and lifestyle. The priority of effort should be kept generic and not announced in advance. While this focuses our effort, it retains the flexibility to reassess and re-prioritize those interests as changes in political leadership and world events transpire.

Tenet 2: If we decide to commit forces to intervention overseas, we <u>must</u> have clearly defined political and military objectives. We should know precisely the suitability of our forces to accomplish those clearly defined objectives. We should have, and send, the forces needed to do just that <u>interacting</u> with the other elements of power in achieving the <u>overall</u> political objectives.

Clearly defined political and military objectives are the foundation for employment success. They are essential as we define success criteria in a proactive approach to protecting national interests. Although the need for these objectives has not changed, it is at this time that the 'suitability' or appropriate use of military force should be decided. A determination of suitability does not limit the use of military power to only areas addressing threats to vital interests.

Once appropriateness has been determined, the military will require an understanding of the influence and capabilities of the other elements of power in each given situation. The foundation

for this interaction must be established within the highest levels of our senior political and military leadership. This interaction for the military, whether in a supporting role or a supported role, will be key in achieving the overall end state of the political objectives.

Tenet 3: If we decide to conduct military intervention of any nature, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with a clear definition of success. If we cannot determine feasible success criteria and are unwilling to commit the forces and resources necessary to achieve our goals, we should not commit them at all.

In any military intervention, the establishment of success criteria will be key for military commanders to adequately achieve military objectives. This, in turn, fulfills the military portion of the overall political objectives established by our political leaders. Success criteria must meet the test of 'feasibility'. It is necessary that the capacity and the capabilities of the resources applied to a given situation allow for the successful attainment of the military end state. If designed correctly, achievement of the military end state will set the stage for the successful attainment of the political end state.

Tenet 4: The relationship between the objectives and the forces committed must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. If the political objectives and the political end state change, the military objectives, desired end state, and resources applied must be adjusted accordingly.

A continuous assessment process recognizes that world situations and political sensitivities change over time. Changes in political objectives cause a mismatch with military objectives

and military success criteria. If shifts occur, political and military objectives must be re-evaluated to analyze how the changes affect the suitability and feasibility of the military force in an ongoing operation. It further causes a look at risks, costs, and trade-offs associated with any change in policy. This evaluation should further pursue an examination of reshaping the other applied elements of power. If a policy shift does occur, changes must be translated down to the military commander to ensure the military objectives are achievable and the military end state is compatible with revised political objectives and end state.

Tenet 5: Before the United States commits military forces to intervention, there is a reasonable expectation that the political and military leadership will obtain the support of the American people and their elected representatives of Congress. This support will be achieved through a clear statement of the threat the nation faces; identification of how this threat impacts on national interests and national values; and, the potential risks and costs associated in dealing with this threat. The support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation.

Public and congressional support cannot be guaranteed in advance of any commitment of our Armed Forces. However, it is incumbent upon our senior leadership to apply an acceptability test to each and every consideration in the use of military force. This analysis must weigh the costs and risks associated with the lives of our soldiers against what is to be gained for the nation. Once acceptability has been determined, a continuous, open and frank dialogue with the American people and their elected representatives is critical to foster support.

Inherent in fostering this support is increased emphasis on the diplomatic attributes of our senior military leadership.

Their communicative skills in providing advice to our senior political leadership and the American people will take on new emphasis. They further must be pragmatic in establishing and stating realistic objectives that can be obtained within acceptable costs and risks.

Tenet 6: The commitment of U.S. forces to intervention will only be taken in support of national interests and national values without hegemonic desires.

We must maintain our credibility as a nation and super power. Our allies and adversaries must understand that we will commit military force to further our national interests and national values. No longer will we only utilize military power as a last resort. Instead, we will integrate it into the overall political strategy of the nation. As the elements integrate and complement each other, we will further democratic ideals by setting the example. During this period of credibility maintenance, our leadership must emphasize that the United States does not possess hegemonic desires against other nations.

Rather, we will continue to maintain our place as a super power through coalitions detering other adversaries from demonstrating hegemonic advances.

#### Conclusions

In summary, the revised Weinberger Doctrine for the future use of military force is designed to have a more open and

expeditionary approach. The philosophy for future use of military force must be pro-active in achieving our national interests and supporting our national values. We should not repeat the lessons of the past in applying military force after all other methods have failed.

The future formulation of national and military strategies should seek to wield military force as an active participant intertwined with the other elements of power. The future use of military force can greatly assist in promoting democratic ideals, national interests and national values. This positive or forward looking approach should seek to keep our adversaries in check while furthering the goals of our nation. By applying the revised Weinberger Doctrine tenets, our military will be at the forefront in the maintenance of global stability. At the same time, this revision allows for application of sufficient force if major combat should occur again. This doctrine coupled with the sound judgements of our senior political and military leadership will make the difference for the future.

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